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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
1.  VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS AND THE RULES IN FORCE 
Ever  since  CoU.ncil  Regulation  No 17.  entered  into  force1  a  major  <;:oncem  of 
Coi11lllunity competition policy has been.the handling of agreements and concerted 
practices entered into by firms operating each at a:  different stage of the economic 
process,  in  respect  of the  supply  or  purchase,  or  both,  'of goods  for  resale  or 
proces-sing, or in respect· of  the marketing of services (''vertical 'agreements"). This 
concept  of  vertical  agreements  includes  exclusive  distribution  agreements,  . 
exclusive purchasing agreements, franchising agreements and selective distribution 
. agreements, and combinations of these, whether they are concerned with finished 
goods, intermediateproducts or services;  · 
Article 4( l) of Regulation No 17 provides that agreements, decisions and concerted 
.  -practices of the  kind  described~  in .Article 85(1)  of the Treaty  and  in  respect  of 
which  -the  parties  seek  application  of  Article 85(3)  must  be  notified  to  the 
Commission.  Until  they  have  been  notified,  no  decision  in  application  of 
Article 85(3) may be taken.  Ii1  order to  limit the number of agreemtiilts subject to 
notification  and  to  take  account  of the  fact  that some  agreements· have  special 
characteristics  which  may  make  them  less  harmful  to  the  development of the 
common  .market,  Article 4(2)  of  Regulation  No J 7'  provides  that ·  · the 
-abovementioned  provisions  are  not  applicable  to  agreements,  decisions  ·and 
conceited practices satisfying certain specific ·criteria2.  It  is  a fact,  however,  that 
most vertical agreements caught by Article 85(1) are not exempt from notification 
.underArticle 4(2).  ·  - -
First Regulation imp-lementing Articles85 and 86,ofthe.Treaty, OJ 13, 21.2. 1962, p. 704;amended by 
Regulation  No 59,  OJ  58,  10.7:1962,  p.l655; by  Regulation  No 118/63/EEC, oj 162,  7.11.1963, 
p. 2696; and by Regulation (EEC) No 2822171, OJ L 285, 29.12.1971, p. 49.  ·  · 
2  Article 4(2) stipulates -that  the  notification  obligation does not apply to  "agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices where:  '  '  '  ' 
(I)  'the only parties thereto are undertakings from one Member State and the agreements, decisions 
or practices do not relate either to imports or to exports between Member States; 
(2)  not more than two undertakings are party thereto, and the agreements only: 
(a) restrict the freedom of one party to the contract in  determining the  prices or conditioils of-
.  business upon which  the  goods which  he  has  obtained  from  the other party to  the contract 
may be resold; or.  ·  · 
(b) impose restrictions on the exercise of the rights of the assignee or user of industrial property 
rights~ in particular·patents, utility models, designs or trade marks- or of the person entitled 
under a contract to the assignment, or grant, of the right to use a method of manufacture or' 
knowledge relating to the use and to the application of  industrial processes;  · 
(3)  they have as their sole object:  · 
(a) the development or uniform application of  standards or types; or . 
(b) joint research and development;  ·  · 
·(c) sl?ecialisation in  the manufacture of products,_ including agreements necessary for achieving 
this, where the products which are the subject of  speciillisation ,do not, in a substantial part of 
the common market, represent more than  15% of the  volume of business done  in  identical 
products or those considered by  consumers to  be .similar by  reason of their characteristics, 
price and use, and where the total annual turnover of  the participating undertakings does not 
.  ·exceed 200 million units of  account.  '  .  . ·.  .  .  .  .  '  .  ' 
Tllcse agreem1:1nts, decisions and practicesmaybe notified to the Commission.;'  .  2  .  . 
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In  order further to  facilitate  the. Commission's task in handling the notifications 
submitted,  the  Council  adopted  Regulation  No 19/65/EEC3,  on  the  ·basis  of 
Article 87 of  the Treaty, which empowers it to adopt ahy appropriate regulations or 
directives "to lay down detailed rules for the application -of Article 85(3), taking 
into  account  the  need  to  ensure  effective  supervision  on the  one  hand,  and  to 
simplify administration to the greatest possible extent on the other". By means of 
the  Regulation,  the  ·Couricil  enabled  the  Commission  to  declare  by  way  of 
regulation that Article 85(1) does not apply to categories of agreements to which 
· only two  undertakings are party and  whereby one  party agrees  with the_ other to 
supply  only  to  that  other certain  goods  for  resale  within  a  defined  area· of the 
common market, or-whereby one party agrees with the. other to purchase on,ly from 
that other certain goods for resale, or whereby the. two undertakings have entered 
into  obligations with each other in  respect of exclusive supply and  purchase fbr 
resale4.  It must be pointed out that the scope of the powers were defined in such a  · 
way as to cover the most frequently used types of vertical agreement which, at the 
time of the adoption of Regulation No 19/65/EEC, were on the whole represented 
by bilateral exclusive territorial sales concession comracts for goods for resale . 
. Thus,  acting  under  the  powers  granted  to  it  by  Regulation  No 19/65/EEC,  the 
Comniission  adopted  block  exemption  regulations  to  cover  certain  specifi~ 
distribution systems. The regulations currently cover: 
' 
exclusive distribution agreements (Regulation (EEC) No 1983/835);  . 
- exclusive purchasing agreements (Regulation (EEC)-No 1984/83°); 
- franchise agreements (Regulation (EEC) No 4087  /887). 
In addition to the systems described above, the Commission examined another tbm1  . 
of distribution,  i.e~ selective distribution. As the powers granted under Regulation  · 
No 19/65/EEC do  not cover this field,  the  Commission was unable to  adopt any 
· block exemption regulation for selective distribution. Its policy was therefore .based 
solely on individual decisi<;ms and/or positions. 
In a complex modern economy, distribution systems and vertical relationships are 
very varied,  not only because of the  emergence of new distribution methods but 
also· owing  to  the  need  of a  growing  ntunber  of economic  operators  for  a 
combination of different  types  of vertical  agreement  in their  search  for . greater · 
flexibility  in  contractual  relationships.' It goes without  saying that the difference 
between the types of  distribution referred to above does not cover all forms or types 
of vertical agreement which, to the extent that they are covered by Article 85, must 
be  notifie~ and examined case by case. 
OJ  36, 6.3.1965, p. 533, as last amended by the Act of  Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
Article I (I  )(a) of Regulation No 19/65/EEC. 
OJ  L 173,  30.6.1983,  p.  I, as  last  amended  by  Regulation  (EC)  No 1582/97, OJ L214, 6.8.1997, 
p.27.  .  -
OJ  L 173,  30.6.1983,  p. 5,  as  last  amended  by  Regulation  (EC) No 1582/97,  OJ L 214,  6.8.1997, 
p.27.  . 
OJ L 359, 28.12.1988, p. 46. Although franchise agreements are used especially for the distribution of. 
goods, they were covered as a category only by virtue of  the powers conferred on the Commission by 
Article l(l)(a) and (b) of  Regulation No 19/65/EEC.  ·  · 
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2.  REVIEW  OF  COMMUNITY  COMPETITION  POLICY  ON  vERTICAL 
RESTRAINTS' 
On  22  January  1997,  the  Coinnl'ission  .. published  a  Green  Paper  on 
Vertical Restraints  in  EC  Competition- Policy  With  the  aim  of stimulating  a 
. wide-ranging debate  on the application of Article SS(l) and ,(3) of the Treaty to 
vertical agreements  .. 
The paper w~s prompted first by the prospect of the expiry of the abovementioned 
block exemption Regulations, recently extended to 31  December 1999. It  ~lso felt 
that it  would  be  a timely  opportunity to  assess the  extent .  to  which  Community 
policy  in  this  area  needed  changing  in  order  to  t~e account  both  of progress 
towards completion _of  the  internal  market  and, of the  radica}  transformation  in 
distribution  structures  and  techniql:les  in  recent .·years,  .. chiefly·  due  to  -the 
introduction of  information technologies. 
The  publication  of· the  Green  Paper  gave  rise , to  numerous  responses  from 
the business  and  legal  communities,  as  well. as  from  the  Member States,  th~ 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of . 
the Regions. The Commission was.thus afforded the opportunity to take' complete 
stock of the main criticisms levelled at· its policy in this area, relating both. to· the 
' substance ofthe'rules and some aspects oftheir implementing procedures. 
-
2.1  Review of the substantive rules 
As regards the substantive rul~s, there are three mmn reasons which have been put~-
forward for dissatisfaction in this area...  ·  · 
. ' 
2.1. I  The scope of  the Regulations is too iimited 
Regulations· (EEC) Nos 1983/83,  1984/83  ~d  4087/88  c~ver onLy  categories  of 
bilateral exclusive agreements concluded with a view to resale which relate either 
to the distribution and/or exclusive purchase of goods .or comprise -restrictions on 
the acquisition or use of intellectual propertY rights.  They do not therefore cover 
· agreements  between  more  thari  two  firms  operating  at  different  stages  of· the 
economic process, selective distribution agreements, agreements on the marketing 
of  services  or  agreements  concerning  the  supply  of  goods , for ·.  utilisation, 
·transformation and processing of products supplied by a  supplier. The exclusion of 
such  agreements .  means  that  they  are  subject  to  a  more  cumbersome  vetting . 
procedure,  as  they  qualify  for  exemption under Article 85(3)· of the  Treaty  only· 
when the Gommission -has  examined each one individually.  In order to cope with·  . 
the mass of notifications, sys!ematic recourse to comfort letters became inevitable; 
this does not give firms the same :guarantee of legal certainty as a block exemption 
. regulation. The criticisms emphasise the lack of valid -reasons, based  ~m economic' 
analysis.  which  could justify such· different treatment of the  agreements.  On the· 
· other hand,  it  w~s generally accepted that vertical agreements between competing 
~ ·  ·  tirms should not be covered by any block exemption regulations, although small or 
medium-sized firms could be given more favoi.lrable treatment. 
4 2.1. 2 The rules are too inflexible 
The  block  exemption  regulations  in  force  cover  only  certain  specific  forms  of _ 
distribution and are applicable only on condition that the agreements contain certain 
typical clauses. In addition,, they do. not simply specify the restraints or clauses that 
cannot be included in agreements ("black clauses"), they also include an exhaustive 
list of exempted clauses ("white clauses"). By this means, firms in the process of 
defining their contractual relationships have a ~uch  more limited choice, since all 
agreements with restrictive clauses not corresponding to  the form 'of distribution 
specifically  concerned  and/or  the  "white"  clauses  listed  in  the  abovementioned 
Regulations do  not qualify for the block exemption and  thus lose the advantages 
and  legal  certainty  offered  by  the  latter;  Thus,  in  a  context  where  economic 
,structures and the size of markets are evolving rapidly, the lack of flexibility in the 
present  rules"  can  adversely  affect  the  development  of innovative  and/or  more 
competitive forms or methods of distribution. The criticisms fall  short of attacking 
the value of block exemption as a tool, but stress the need to replace existing rules 
with  simpler  and  more  flexible  exemption  rules  which  would  simply  identify 
vertical  restraints,  or combinations of such restraints;  whose  incorporation  in an 
agreement would entail the non-application of Article 85(3) to such agreements. In 
other  words,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  replace  the  present  system,  involving 
exemption regulations comprising an exhaustive list of exempted clauses, with a 
new approach based mainly on the identifi<;:ation of  "black" clauses. 
2.1. 3 An overly formalistic approach 
The present regulations are often criticised for taking an approach based solely on 
an analysis of the clauses contained in the agreements they exempt, without taking 
account of the economic effects-such agreements are likely to have on the markets 
on which they operate. Aimed at both the block exemption regulations in force und 
the  broad  interpretation  traditionally  given  by  the  Commission to  Article  85( I), 
the criticism is  twofold.  First,  the  Commission's current approach does  not  give 
sufficient· weight  to  the  gains  in  efficiency  secured  by  vertical  agreements,  and 
gives  excessive  weight  to  restrictions  which  affect  competition  only  between 
products  of ·the  same  brand.  Secondly,  it  is  pointed  out  that,  in  applying 
Article 85(3) by regulation, the Commission is exaggeratedly extending the scope  . 
of  its  block  exemption  regulations,  which  continue  to  apply  even  where 
competition  between · brands  is  weak  and  contract  goods  account  for  a  large 
proportion of  the market in question. This results in a lack of differentiation .in the 
assessment  of restrictions  of competition  between  brands  and  restrictions  of 
competition  between  same-brand  products,  and  in  inadequate  supervision  of 
vertical agreements between firms with market power. 
2.2  Review of procedures 
The discussions that followed the  publication of the Green Paper also highlighted 
the cumbersome nature of the existing system, which calls for the notification of a 
large · number  of  vertical  agreements  not  covered  by  the  block  exemption 
regulations in  force.  The system involves administrative costs which firms  regard 
as excessive and, by compelling the Commission to deal with ali the cases notified 
to  it, prevents it from concentrating more of its efforts on monitoring agreements 
that are more harmful to competition. 
'  5 l 
The main criticism concerns Article 4(2) of Regulation No 17 which, as currently 
. worded, is not regarded as capable of carrying out its original function, i.e:' to filter 
· out cases that appear a priqri to be less harmful to competition by exempting them 
·from prior notification. 
First, vertical-agreements should benefit from a more flexible procedure: than that · 
applicable  to  horizontal agreements,  as  they generally  entail  fewer  dangers. to  · 
.  competition.  .  Whilst  horizontal  agreel!lents  concern  substitutable  services  or 
products, vertical agreements relate only to supplementary products or services  .. 
~ecoridly; the provisions of Article 4(2)(1) which exempt from prior notification 
only agreements concluded between undertakings from one Member State and· not 
relating either to imports or exports between Member States are no longer 6f any 
·practical value since,· with ongoing Community integration, there is an increasing 
numbe;r  of vertical _agreements  capable -of affecting .  imports  or.' exports  between  ·. 
Member States.  , ·  . · / 
Thirdly,  there  is  an  imbalance,  which  Article 4(2)  does  not  rectify,  between 
agreements ih respect of the· supply or purchase,  or both,- of goods for  resale or · 
proCe$Sing, or irt respect of  the Illllrketing of  services, Which arc generally subject to 
the prior notification requirement, and licensing· agreements. _whichto a large extent. 
are .covered by the exemption in' Article 4(2)(b). .  .  . " ,  . .  . 
2.3  ·The need for reform 
The views: expressed by the :business and legal  communities and the  institutions 
foilowing ,the publication of the Green Paper -are  thus generally all in favour of a 
reform of  Community competition policy on vertical agree~ents. 
.  <'Any such reform must sa:tisfy two objectives: first, it must ensure more effective 
protection  of c~mpetition,  while  providing  adequate  legal  certainty  for  firms; 
secondly, it should take account·of the  need to simplify administration  and  the 
regulatory framework to the greatest possible extent.  ·  · 
f  The various aspects of the !eform are-described in detail  in the policy document 
..  , ~~·.  .  . ' 
which the Commis.sion has adopted in parallel with th~s Communication.· It should 
be  noted  that  the·  proposed  reform  comprises  both  an  amendment  to  the  blo~k 
. exemption regulations in force and some ·relaxation of  procedures. However. as the 
powers conferred on the Commission by Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC do not 
· allow it to carry out such a reform, it is necessary to extend the scope of  the powers . 
provided  for  in  the  Regulation.  It·  i~  also  necessary,  in  order  to .achieve  ~e 
· abovementioned  objectives, .  to' update  the  notification  system  provided  for  in 
Article 4(2) of  Council Regulation No 17.  ·  · 
3.  .  EXTENSION  OF  THE  POWERS  ~ROVIDED lFOR  IN. REGULATION  · 
No 19/65/EEC 
As far as the substantive -rules  ~e  concerned,_ it would be desirable: to replace the 
existing block exemption regulations by rules that  ~e. simpler,  mor~ flexible. and 
· better targeted.  ·  ·  · First,  in response to the criticisms referred to in point 2.1.1  above, the scope of  the 
new  exemption  regulation  should  be  broader  and  should ·cover  all  vertical 
agreements relating to the supply and/or purchase ofgoods for resale or processing, 
and the marketing of  services, concluded between two or more firms each operating 
at  a  different  st~ge ·of the  economic  process.- Vertical  agreements  between 
competitors would not  b~ covered. though more  favourable  treatment would  be 
accorded to small and medium-sized ent~rprises. 
As  already  pointed  out, -however,  Article l(l)(a)  of the  Regulation  gives  the 
Commission the power to  declare by regulation that Article 850) does not apply 
to categories of agreements to which only two undertakings are party and whereby 
.  one _party agrees with the other to s:upply only to that other certain goods for resale-
within a defined area of  the common market, or whereby one- party agrees with the 
other to· purchase  only from that  other certain goods for  resale,  or whereby  the 
two firms have entered into such exclusive supply and purchasing obligations. 
The attached proposal for a Council Regulation extends the scope of such powers 
in ord~r to  enable the  Commission tq  cover,  by block  exemption regulation. and 
provided they  are  caught  by  Article 85(1),  all  types  of  vertical  agreements 
concluded between  two or more  firms,  each  operating at a different .  stage of the 
economic process,  in  respect of the  supply and/or purchase of  goods tor resale or 
processing  or  in  respect  of  the  ·marketing  of  services,  including  exclusive 
distribution agreements, exclusive purchasing agreements, franchising agreements 
and  selective  distribution  agreements,  and  combinations  thereof. ' The  block 
exemption  would  not  cover  vertical  ·agreements  between  actual  or  potential 
competitors, except where the agreement is a non-reciprocal one and none of the 
parties  have  an  · annual  turnover  exceeding  ECU 100 million,  or where 
the agreement is  between an association of  retailers and its members, or between 
such  an association  and .  its  suppliers,  and  the  members  of ·the  association  are 
small arid medium-sized  enterprises  as  defmed  in  the  Annex  to  Commission 
Recommendation 96/280/EC.  A  further  justification  for  extending  the  scope  of 
block· exemption is that a large number of  notifications concern vertical agreements 
not covered by the block exemption regulations in force; the experience acquired by 
the  Commission  in  adopting  decisions  or  individual  positions  now  allows  it  to 
define  the  limits  within which  vertical·  agreements  are  likely  to  satisfy  the 
conditions of  Article 85(3) ofthe Treaty. 
Secondly,  in order to meet the criticisms in point 2.1.2 above, it is planned to adopt 
an  exemption  regulation  for  all  types  of vertical  agreement  which,  based  on  a 
broader  concept,  would  be  aimed  at  identifying  vertical  restrictions-,  . or 
combinations thereof,  which,  if implemented, would entail  loss of  the  benefit of 
· block  exemption  ("black" clauses).  Such  a  change  requires  amendment  of 
Article 1  (2)(b)  of  Regulation  No 19/65/EEC,  which  provides- that  all  block 
exemption regulations  must specify "the clauses which must be  contained in the 
agreements". The attached proposal for a Council Regulation accordingly proposes 
to  abolish  this  provision,  which  is  at  the  root of the  lack of flexibility  and  the 
"straitjacket" effect which the rules in force are said to have. 
Thirdly;  in response to the criticisms in point 2.1.3 above, the rules should be more 
specifically targeted.  The ·Commission  consider~ that  a  wider  block  exemption, 
achieved.  in  particular -by  abandoning  the  approach  based  on  identifying  each 
·individual form of  exempted distribution, should be counterbalanced by introducing 
7 .. 
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economic .criteria .limiting· the  applicability- of the  exemption· regulation  on the · 
ground of the possible anticompetitive. effects of the agreements concerned. This 
would  allow  more  effective  supervision:of the  vertical  agreem~!J.ts concluded 
between firms with ptarket power. 
The  Commission  considers  that_  the  means  of achieving  that  objective  must 
necessarily take account of the share of the relevant matket accounted for by the 
contract goods. Thus, if the market shares o(the parties to the agreement exceed a 
given threshold, the block exe_mption regulation would no longer be applicable  . 
The attached·proposa1 indicates that all exemption regulations concerning vertical 
agreements which are adopted under the powers granted to the Commission by the 
-Council must specify the criteria,. such as the level -of the market share thresholds, 
for~identifying the circumstances in which, having regard to the economic effects of 
.  .  I 
the agreements concerned, the block exemption regulation is no longer applicabJe:  _ 
Finally, whe1_1  an  agree~ent covered by the block exe'mptionnonetheless produces 
-effects  which are  incompatible with the conditions set out by  Article  85(3},  the  -
Commission c~  withdraw the benefit of the .  block exemption.  With the :view -to 
( · ensuring the effective monitoring ofmarkets and an increased decentralisation in-
the· implementation of EC ·competition. rules,. it· is justified-to .  provide that,  when 
such an· agreement produces its anti-competitive effects in-a: Member State- territory 
and  this  terri  to!)'  has  all  the characteristics of a.-distinct antitrust  market,  the-
competent national  competition. authority may withdraw the benefit. of the ·block. 
exemption in respect of its territory-by adopting a decision aimed at removing the . 
aforesai<:i effects. Accordingly, the attached proposed Council RegulE1tion contains a 
provision which suppfements ArtiCle 7 of  RegUlation No'  19/65/EEC, by stipulating 
the circumstances under which national authorities ·may withdraw the beriefirof the 
block exemption.  - - - . 
The- withdrawal  procedure -·will- be  applicable  both  in ·respect  of  individual 
agreements and parallel networks of similar agreements. Nevertheless, it must_ be_ 
-emphasised that. the problems arising from the presence of these parallel netWorks 
are  frequent,  particularly. in  the  context  of selective  distribution.- Taking  into · 
·.  account the widened scope of the proposed block exemption, it seems appropriate, 
in addition to  the general' remedy of.the withdrawal procedure,  to provide  for  a  ' 
specific mechanism intended to guarantee the effective control of  these distribution 
networks.  In this regard, it is proposed to  provide that _the  block exemption will -
contain a  condition  based on the coverage .rate  of the  relevant  market .by  s~ch 
networks-and having as its object the exClusion of  such agreements from the benefit. 
-ofthe block exemption. Given thai the· compariiesconcemed may nothave access 
to precise sector-wide data,· this condition should not be ·automaticaiiy applicable._ 
It is therefore proposed that the future block exemption-regulation will empower  · 
_  ··th~ Conuriission to establish ex officio that, with regard to. a given market, such a 
condition  is  fulfilled  -and;  to  fix  a  period  of not  less  than  six  months,  at 
~  the expiration  of  which  the  block  exemption  will  cease  -to·  apply  to  the 
-agreements concerned. The. relevant. Commission decision will be published in·the 
Ojjicia/Journal oft  he European  Communities·.· In order to  grant the Commission· · · 
the . powers  necessary  to  implement. this ' mechanism,  the . attached  proposed. 
Council  Regulations  contains  ·a . provision  which . supplements'  Article  7  of 
Regulation No 19/65/EEC .. · 
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I 4.  RELAXATION OF THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR· 
IN REGULATION No 17 
· The main ,drawbacks of  th~  .present notification ·~ystem have already been described . 
:above in point 2.2.  · 
There  is .another  good  reason  for  relaxin,g  the  system.  The  proposed· reform 
endeavours ·to achieve a  better balance .between,  on the  one hand,  the  need  to 
protect  competition  more  effectively  and,  on  the  other,  the  need  to  provide 
adequate legal certainty for firms. In order to~ attain that balance, the Commission 
considers  that  the  new  type  of block  exemption,  which  introduces  economic 
criteria in the form  of  .market  share  thresholds,  necessitates a  broadening of the  ·  · 
provision  in Article 4(2)  of Regulation  No 17  .granting  dispensation  from  .the 
prior notification requirement.  · 
The Commission proposes that the Council extend the scope of Article 4(2)(2)(a) 
by replacing the existing text by a  new provision stipulating that all  agreements 
concluded between two or more firms  each operating at a different stage of the 
economic process in respect of the supply and/or purchase of goods for resale or 
. processing or iri respect of the marketing of services are exempt from notification 
under paragraph 1 ofthat Article. 
The practical advantage of the  proposed amendment from  the  point of view of 
~.  firms  is  the  fact  that  the· Commission  could  in  future,  even  'in  cases  of late 
notification, consider whether the agreements in question satistied the conditions of 
Article 85(3) and, if  s.o,  it could then adopt an exemption decision taking· effect on 
the date on which the agreement was entered into.  Iri this way the legal certainty 
.  afforded to fi:rms  would be strengthened, as the proposed amendment removes the 
automatic  nullity which applies under the present system to  vertical  agreements 
caught by Article '85( 1) if  they are not notified. In addition, the .amendment does not 
entail  a  relaxation  in the  task of supervision  entrusted .  to  the  Commission,  as 
Article 4(2) does not prevent the Commission from prohibiting vertical agreements 
caught by Article 85(1) which do not satisfy the tests of Article 85(3), and, in the 
absence of  notification, froni imposing fines.  · 
The attached, propo~al  for a Couiicil Regtilation contains the necessary amendment 
to Regulation No 1  7 ·in order  to achieve the proposed reform.·· 
5.  PROPOSAL 
·In v:iew ofthe foregoing, the Com~ission  proposes that the Council adopt: 
the Regulation amending Council Regulation No 19/65/EECof  2 March 1965 
·On  the  application  ·of  Article :85(3)  of ·the  Treaty  to  certain · categories 
of  agreements and concerted practices, and . 
the Regulation amendiQg Council Regulation No 17,of 6 Febnuity 1'962, the 
.. first Regulation .implementing Articles 85 and 86 of  the. Treaty. 
9 
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· Prop9sal for a 
COUNC~L  REGULATION (EC) 
98/0287 (CNS) 
·amending Regulation No ·t9/65/EEC on  ~e. application of  Article 85(3) 
of  the Treaty to certain categories of  agreements· and concerted practices 
----------·. 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN t.J:NION, 
. Having  regard  to  the  Tt~aty establishing  the  European Community,  aJKl  in  particular: 
• Article 87 thereof, 
Havin.g regard to the proposal from the Commission8,  · 
Having regard to the opinion of~e  European_Parfiament9, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee111•  _ 
I.  Whereas by Regulation No 19/65/EEC  11, as last amended by the Act of'Accession 
_ of Austria, Finland and Sweden, the Council empowered the Commission, without-
prejudice  to  the  application  .of  Council  Regulation  No  -171 ~:  First  Regulation  . 
implementing Articles  85  and  86  of the  Treaty,  as  last /amended  by  the  Act  of 
Accession of  Austria, Finland and Sweden; and in accordance with Article 85(3) of 
the  Treaty,  to  adopt  reg~lations declaring  that  Article 85(1)  does  not  apply  to 
certain categories of agreer:nents,  and  in  particular to  categories of agreements to 
which only two undertakings are party and whereby one party agrees with the ()ther  . 
to  supply only to  that other certain goods for resale within  a defined- area of the .. 
common market, or whereby one party agrees with the other to .purchase only from . 
· that other certain goods for resale, or whereby the two undertakings, enter into such·. 
obVg(ltions with each other iri n!spect of  exclusive ·sl1pply and pilrchase for resale; 
2.  Wherea~, pursuan.t to Regulation No 19/65/EEC,  'the_  ~ommission has in particular  _ 
adopted ·Regulations (EEC) No 1983/8313  and (EEC} No  1984/8314  regarding the 
application of Article 85(3)  of the Treaty to categories of exClusive  distribution 
agreements- and  to  categories  of exclusive  purchasing-agreements,  respectively .. 
both  of which were  hist  am~nded by  Regulation  (EC)  No't582/97_1s,  and  also 
Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 16; as amended by the  Act of Accession of Austria. 
'.  .  - .  .  '  ·,  . 
R. 
1) 
OJC 
OJC 
l.ll  ·- OJC 
II  . OJ 36, 6.3.1965, p. 533/65. 
12  OJ  13,'21.2.1962, p. 204/62. 
13  OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p.  l. 
14  · · OJ L 173; 30.6.1983, p. 5. 
·15  OJL214,6.8.1997,p.27. 
16  OJ L  359, 28'.12.1988, p. 46. 
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Finland and Sweden,  regarding the  application of ~ticle 85(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of  franchise agreements; 
Whereas  on  22 January 1997  the  Commission. published  a  Green  Paper  on 
Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy11,  which was intended to generate a 
wide-ranging public-debate on the application of  Article 85(1) and (3) of  the Treaty 
to agreements or concerted practices entered into by. undertakings each operating at 
a different stage of the economic process in respect of the supply or purchase, or 
both, of goods for resale or processing, or in respect of the marketing of services 
("vertical  agreements"),  inCluding  exclusive  distribution  agreements,  exclusive 
purchasing  agreements,  franchising  agreements  and  · selective  distribution 
agreements;  whereas  this  class  of  agreement  does  not  include  vertical · 
agreements between  actual  or potential  competitors,  unless  the  agreement is a 
non~reciprocal one  and  none  of the  parties  have  an  annual  turnover  exceeding 
ECU 100 million,  or is  between  an  association  of retailers· and  its_-members,. or 
between  such- an  association  and  its  suppliers,  and  _the  members· of  the 
association are  small  or  medium-sized  enterprises  as  defined  in  the  Annex  to 
Commission Recommendation 96/280/ECIB; 
4.  Whereas  the  response . to  the  Green  Paper  from  the  Member States,  the 
· European Parliament,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  the  Committee  of 
the Regions and interested .  parties in business and the legal professions ·has been 
generally  in  favour ·of reform  of Community  competition  policy  on  vertiCal 
agreements;  whereas the biock exemption  rc~gulat1ons already referred to should 
accordingly be revised; 
5.  Whereas. any .such reform must meet the two requirements of ensuring effective 
protection of  competition and providing adequate legal certainty for firms; whereas 
the pursuit of  those objectives should take account ofthe need as far as possible to 
simplify administrative supervision and the legislative framework; 
6.  Whereas the exempting regulations already referred to do not confine themselves to 
defining  the  categories of agreement  ~o which they apply and  to  specifYing  the 
restrictions or clauses which are not to be contained in the agreements, .but also-list 
the  restrictive clauses exempted; whereas this legislative_ approach to  contractual 
relations  is  generally perceived to  be  over-rigid  in· an economic  context where 
distribution structures and techniques are ~apidly changing; 
.  . 
7.  Whereas  the  regulations  refer  only  to  those  categories  of bilateral  exclusive 
agreements  entered  into  with  a  view  to  resale  which  are  concerned  with  the 
exclusive.distt:ibution or purchase of goods, or both, or which include. restrictions 
imposed  in  relation  to  the  assignment  or  use  of industrial  property  rights; 
whereas they  exclude  from  their  scope  agreements  between  more  than  two 
undertakings  operating  at  different  stages  of the  economic  process,  selective 
distribution agreements, agreements for the marketing of services, and agreements 
concerning  the  supply  or purchase,  or both,  of goods  intended  for  processing; 
whereas a substantial number of vertical agreements consequently cann:ot qualify 
17  COM(96) 721  final. 
18  OJ  L 107, 30.4.1996, p. 4. 
11 for  exemption  under  Article 85(3)  of  the  Treaty  until  they  have  been 
examined individually -by  the Cominission, which may  reduce the legal certainty 
available  to  the. undertakings  concerned'  and  make  administrative  supervision 
·.unnecessarily -burdensome; 
8.  .  Whereas the debate which followed the publication of the Green Paper also drew 
attention to the facuhat in determining the manner in w}licb Article 85(1) and· (3) 
-are to apply proper account needed to be taken of the economic effects of  vertical 
agreements;  whereas  any  economic  criteria  limiting  the  scope _  of the  block 
..  exemption  by  reason  of the  anticompetitive  effects  wh~ch. an  agreement may 
produce must necessarily take into  con~ideration the share of the  relevant market 
accounted for by the goods covered by _the agreement;. 
9.  Whereas,  therefo~e. it would be  _advisable  to replace .  the existing legislation with 
legislati~n which is simple~, more flexible and better targeted,. and which covers all 
kinds  of vertical  agreement;  whereas  if the .scope  of_ the  exempting  regulation 
covering-such agreements. is to  be  broadened in this way' .there  sh_oul~ be criteria ... 
such as market-share thr~sholds to specify the circumstances where, in view of the 
economic effects of  the agreement, that regulation ceases-to be applicable; 
10.  Whereas th~ powers _conferred on the Commission by Regulation No·l9/65/EEC do 
not allow it to  conduct such a reform of the rules currently in ·force; ·whereas the 
scope 'of Article l(l)(a) and  (2)(b)  thereof should consequently be  broadened  to 
cover all kinds of vertical agreement caught by Article 85(1) of the Treaty ·which 
are entered-into bytwo or more undertakings, each operating at a.different stage of 
· the economic process, and which conc~rn the supply or purch~se, or both, of goods 
·for  resale  or  processing;  or  the  marketing  of services,  including  exclusive 
distribution agreements, exclusive purchasing· agreements,  franchis~rig agreements 
and selective distribution agreeinents,or any·co!fibination of  these; 
11.  Whereas the. exempting regulations already referred to empower the Cof!imission. 
in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation No 19/65/EEC, to withdraw the benefit 
ofapplication of those regulations wherever, ·in a particul~ case, an agreement has.  _ 
certain  effects  which  are  incompatible  with _  the  conditions  laid  down  in 
Article 85(3);  whereas  in  order  to  ensure  effective  supervision  of" markets  and 
. greater decentralisation in the application of.the Comm\mity competition rules, it is 
appropriate to  provide that where  the. effects of such an agreement· are  felt  in  a 
Member State  which  possesses  all  the  characteristics  of a  distinct  market  the 
competent authority in that Member State may withdraw the  benefit of the  block 
exemption in  it's. territory and  adopt a decision aimed at eliminating those effects; 
. whereas Article .7  thereof should accordingly be supplemented so as to  specify the 
circumstances  in  which  the  competent  authorities  in  the  Member ·states  may . 
withdraw the benefit of  application of  the block-exemption regulation; 
12.  Whereas,  in  order  to  guarantee  an  effective  control  of the  effects  arising  in  a 
given market  from  the· existence  of parallel  networks  of ·similar  agre_ements,  a 
· block-exemption  regulation  may  establish  the  conditions  under  which  those 
networks of agreements· are excluded from its application; whereas such conditions 
/ may  be  based  on  structural  criteria,  such ·as· the  market. coverage  rate  of these 
agreements; whereas such conditions will not be, applicable automatically because 
the companies concerned may not have access to precise sector~  wide data; whereas 
the  Commissi~n will accordingly be empowered to  es~blish that in a given market 
'  12  . the  relevant  agreements  fulfil  the  conditions;  whereas  in  such  a  case,  the 
Commission will have to fix  a transitional period of not less than six months, at 
. the expiry  of which  the ·  block  exemption  will  cease  to · be·  applicable  to  the 
relevant agreements, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
Regulation ·No 19/65/EEC is hereby amended as follows: 
1.  Article 1 is amended as follows: 
(a)  Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:  , 
· "1.  Without  .prejudice  to  the  application  of Regulation  No 17  and  in 
· accordance with Article 85(3)  of the  Treaty the .Commission may  by 
regulation declare that Article 85(1) shall not apply to: 
~. 
(a)  categories of  agreements between two or more. undertakings, each 
operating at a different stage of the economic process, in respect 
of the  supply  or  purchase,  or  both,  of goods  for  resale  or 
processing,  or  in  respect  of  the  marketing  of  services, 
except where: 
the agreement  is  between actual  or potential competitors, 
unless it is a non-reciprocal agreement none of  the parties to 
which have an animal turnover exceeding ECU I 00 ml.llion, 
or 
the  agreement  is  between  an  association  of retailers  and 
its members,  or  between  such  an  association  and  its 
suppliers,  unless  the  members . of  the  association  are 
small or  medium-sized  enterprises  as  defined  ·  in 
Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC.• 
(b)  categories  of agreements  to  which  only  two  undertakings  are 
party  and  which  include  restrictions  imposed .in  relation  to  the 
acquisition or use  of industrial property  rights  - in  particular of 
patents. utility models, designs or trade marks  ~ or to  the  rights 
· airisng out of contracts for  assignment of, or the  right  to  use, a 
method of  manufacture or knowledge relating to the use or to the 
. application of  industrial processes; 
OJ L 107, 30.4.1996, p. 4." 
(b)  In  paragraph 2(b  ),  the  words  ''the· clauses which must be contained  in the 
agreements, or" are deleted.  · 
13 (c) ·  Paragraph 3  is replaced by the following: 
"3 .. ~Paragraphs  1 ··and  2. shall  apply  by  analogy  to  ·categories  of 
concerted practices.". 
(d)  Th~  following paragraph 4 is added: 
"4.  . For purposes of paragraph 1, an agreement between competitors means 
an agreement which is entered into by manufacturers or distributors of 
identical products or products considered by consumers to be similar by 
reason . of their  characteristics, · price· and  use,  and  which  relates  to 
such-products." 
2.  :- . In Article 7 the following two paragraphs are added: 
"A regulation pursuant to Article  1 may stipulate the conditions which exclude 
from its application certain parallel networks of similar agreements or concerted 
. practices operating on a particular m~ket; when these circUmstances are fulfilled. 
the Commission may esU}blish _this  by means of decision and fix  a period at the  · 
expiry of which the  regulation would no  longer be applicable in respect of the  · 
relevant agreements or concerted practices; such period must not .be shorter than 
six months.  . 
Where  in  any  particular  case  agreements  or  ~oncerted practices  to  which  a -
regulation  adopted pursuant to  Article 1 applies  have  certain effects which  are 
incompatible  with  the  conditions  laid  down  in Article 85(3)  of the  Treaty  in 
the terrhory  of  a  Member ·state,  or  in ·.a  part  thereof,  which  has  all  · the 
characteristics of a distinct market, the competent authority in that Member State 
may  on its own initiative or at  the  request of the  Commission or of natural or 
legal persons Claiming a legitimate interest withdiaw·the benefit of application of 
thatregulatiori. 
11 
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Article 2 
.  . 
. This Regulation slulll enter into .force on the third d~y following that of its publication i11 _ 
the OffiCial Journal ofthe European Communities.  - · 
This..  Regulation·  shall·  be  binding  in  its  entirety  .and ..  directly  ·applicable  c  in · all 
Member States.  · · .  ·  · 
Done at.Brussels,  . 
14 
For the CounciL 
. The President:_  .. ·  . 
. .  . 
- \  . 
<-~  .. 98/0288 (CNS) 
Proposal for a .. 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
amending Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing 
Articles.85 and 86 of  the Treaty 
. ·---------------
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing the  European  Community,  and  in particular 
Article 87 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission  19, 
Having regard to the ~pinion of  the European P~liament20, 
.  -
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee2t, 
1.  Whereas  Article 4(2)  of Regulation  No 1722,  as  last  amended  by  the  Act  of 
Accession  of Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden,  exempts  a  number  of agreements, 
decisions  and  concerted  practices  from  the·  requirement  of notification  under 
Article-4(1 ); 
. 2.  Whereas this exemption relates in particular to agreements. decisions and concerted 
practices where the only parties thereto are undertak.irigs  from one Member State 
and the agreements, decisions or practices do not relate either to imports or exports 
between Member States, or where not mqre than two undertakings are party thereto. 
and  the  agreements  only  restrict  the  freedom  of one  party  to  the  contract ·  in 
determining  the  prices  or ·conditions  of business  upon  which  the  goods  he  hus 
obtained from the other party to the contract may be resold; whereas 'this exemption 
is not therefore such as to cover niost agreements or concerted practices between 
undertakings each at a different stage of the economic process in respect of the 
supply or purchase, or both, of goods for resale or processing, or in respect of the 
marketing of  services ("vertical agreements"), that are likely to fall within the scope 
of  Article 85;  ·  ·  · 
3.  Whereas  on  22 January 1997  the  Commission  published  a  Green  Paper  on 
Vertical Restraints  in  EC  Competition  Polic:y23  which  was  intended  to· generate 
a wide~ranging  public  debate  on  the  application· of Article 85(1)  and  (3)  of 
the Treaty  to· ·vertical  agreements;  whereas  the  response  from  Member States, 
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the· Committee of · 
19  OJC 
20  OJ C 
21.  OJ C 
22  OJ 13, 2 L2.1962, .,. 20  ..  /62. 
23  COM(%) 721  fmal. 
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.the :Regions and interested parties in business and the legal professions has been  .  . 
generally in favour of  reform of  Community competition policy in this area; 
•  •  t  - :  •  .  •  • 
4.  Whereas ·any such  refo~ must meet the tWo requirements of ~nsuring effecti~e 
protection of  competition and providing adequatelegal certainty for firms; whereas, 
in order to achieve these objectives, the Commission has b_een  empo.,yered by the 
Council to -declare,  by  regulation  and  in accordance  with  Article 85(~) of the· 
Treaty,"that Article 85(1)is not applicable· to categor!_es of agreements enteredinto 
by two or· more undertakings, each operating at a  different stage of ihe econprri1c 
process,  in  respect  of the supply  or  purchase,. or both,  of goods  for  re~ale or 
processing,  or  in  respect . of the  ·marketing  of  services,  .including  exclusive 
distribution agreements, exclusive purchasing agre.ements, franchising  agreement~ 
and .selective distribution agreements;  whereas  this  class of agreement does  not< 
include. vertical  agreements .between  actual  or potential  competitors,  unless  the 
agreement is a  non-reciprocal one and none of the parties have an .annual turnover 
exceeding  ECU 1  00 million,· or  is ·between  an  association · of retailers  and  its 
· members, or between such an association and its suppliers, and the members of  the 
associatio'n  are  small  or ·medium-sized  enterprises  as  defined ·in  the  Annex  to 
Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC24; 
.  .  . 
5.  ~- ~Whereas the Coilllflission was aiso called upon to stipulate the circumstances  in 
which, having regard to the economic effects of the relevant agreements, a block 
exemption  Regulation  ceases  to  be  applicable;  whereas  such reform . of the · 
regulatory  framework  applicable  to  vertical  agreem~nts must .• in  addition  take 
account of the need to simplify administrative supervision and as far as possible to 
reduce  the  number of notifications  of vertical  agreements,  which are  'generally 
consider~d less .dangerous  to  competition  than  horizontal  restrictive  practices; 
whereas. it should no longer be necessary to notify vertical agreements before they 
can be 'exempted, so  that Where a vertical agreement is caught by Article 85( 1) and 
. satisfies the tests of Article 85(3) the Commission cari exemptit with dl'ect from 
the date on ~hich it was entered~into;  .  . 
·  6.  ~herea~ the  current' arrangements  impose  em  firms  which  are  party  t~ vertical 
· agreements an administrative burden which,. given their effect- on competit.ion, has 
prov~d in most cases to be ~xcessive;  ·  ·  · 
7.  Whereas  the . agreements  referred  tq  in  Article 4(2) .  of ·Regulation  No  17  are 
dispensed from  the requirement of notification .prior to  exemption; whereas  the 
purpose of  this dispensation is to reduce the nUm.ber: of notifications, which enables · 
the  Commission  to  concentrate  its  efforts  on  superVising  those  restrictive 
agreements which are the-most damaging to  competition; whereas, therefore,.this 
amendment does not entail any relax~tion in the superVision which.  the Commission . 
. has a· duty to exerCise under ¥icle 89(1);  · ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
24  OJ  L 107,)0.4.1996, p. 4, 
16 8.  Whereas  the  scope  of Article 4(2)  of Regulation  No  17  should· therefore  be 
extended,  and  all  agreements  entered  into  by  two  or  more  undertakings,  each 
operating at a different stage of the economic process, in respect of the supply or 
purchase, or both, of goods for resale or processing, or in respect of the marketing 
· ofservices, should be exempted from the requirement of  prior notification, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
Point 2 of  Article 4(2) of  Regulation No  17 is replaced by the following: 
"(2)  the agreements or concerted practices relate to the supply or purchase, or both, of 
goods for resale or processing, or to the marketing of services, and the agreements 
or cpncerted practices are between two or more undertakings each operating at a 
different stage of  the economic process; 
(2a)  not more than two undertaJ9.ngs are party thereto, and the agreements only impose 
restrictions  on  the  exercise  of the  rights  of the  assigp.ee  or  user  of ind~strial 
property rights - in particular patents, utility models, designs or trade marks -' or of 
the person entitled und.er a contract to the assigrunent, or grant, o(  the right to use a 
method of manufacture or knowledge relating to the use and to the applic-ation of 
industrial processes;"  ·  ,  · 
Article 2 
This Regulation shall enter irito force on the third day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal ofthe European Communities. 
This  Regulation  shalf  be  binding  in  its  entirety  and  directly  applicable  in  all 
Member States.  ·- '· 
Done at Brussels, 
17 
. For the Council  _ 
The President 
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